yet to come. Khrushchev's youngest protégé on the Presidium, Dmitry Polyansky, rose to denounce Nikita's agricultural fiascoes with sharply pointed statistics.

Long Authority. Khrushchev was furious, defended himself with a fulminating three-to-four-hour speech laden with curses and invective. Caught unprepared, he could not counter coolly, and may have hoped to carry the night on the strength of his lungs and his long authority. It did not work. Suslov listened quietly until Nikita ran down, then rose to his feet. "You see, Comrades," he said slowly. "It is impossible to talk to him." Khrushchev's face reddened to the point that some witnesses thought he would hit Suslov. But he contained himself while the Presidium voted. It was unanimous against Khrushchev. Remembering 1957, Nikita hotly demanded an immediate session of the Central Committee. Again Suslov replied: "The members of the Central Committee are assembled and waiting."

Perhaps because they had been assembled and waiting for nearly eight hours, the Central Committee members were in no mood to hear more Khrushchevian haranguing. He was interrupted again and again with catcalls from the floor. When one minister accused him of a closed-door policy (he had tried to see Khrushchev for two years and failed), Nikita snapped: "My ministers are a bunch of blockheads." The Central Committee rejected him, but by a close margin. It was nearly dawn. Exhausted, Nikita Khrushchev offered his resignation in a soft, subdued voice and walked out of the hall.

Room with a View. The conflict had been long in the making, at least according to the Kremlin leaks appearing last week. Khrushchev had been voted down by the Presidium last February over his polemical blast at Peking (also composed by Suslov), had to delay a month before making it public while peace feelers went out to Mao and were

rejected. He had further irritated the Central Committee by taking a three-week tour of the farm lands on the lower Volga and in Kazakhstan and not reporting back to them; by erupting in anger at Indonesian President Sukarno when he expressed sympathy for Peking; by announcing late in September a new plan for heavy emphasis on the consumer-goods industry that had not been cleared with the Presidium.

Khrushchev last week was apparently still in Moscow, by best report living in a four-room apartment above the Udarnik Cinema, on Serafimovich Street No. 2, within view of the Kremlin. Some Westerners reported seeing him riding in a limousine; others claimed they saw him walking, soberfaced and sullen, in the environs of Moscow University. All traces of his rule were being removed. When U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler called on new Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, he noted that Nikita Khrushchev's plastic toy cars were gone, along with his familiar paperweight, a lump of ore as crude and solid as its owner.

RED CHINA

Start of the Chain

As the fallout from Peking's nuclear firecracker wafted toward the West, the political chain reaction had only begun. Taking full propaganda advantage of its feat, Red China unctuously dispatched messages to heads of state, among them President Johnson, urging a summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant took up the call, suggested a meeting perhaps next year. The U.S. State Department had already rejected Red China's ploy, calling it "a sucker proposal" since it made no mention of inspection. If the Chinese are really concerned about all this, said the U.S., they can always sign the partial test ban treaty.

But the unavoidable dilemma remained: what to do about a Communist

China that, in the foreseeable future, will be a nuclear power.

Revised Version. Latest intelligence on the device exploded in the Sinkiang Desert indicates that it was slightly stronger and more sophisticated than the U.S. first thought (see SCIENCE). And though it might take 15 or 20 years for the Chinese to develop an intercontinental missile capable of hitting the U.S., Peking may be able to deliver a nuclear bomb along its periphery in as little as five years.

Any type of delivery system, no matter how crude, could vastly change the strategic balance in Asia. In fact, it has subtly changed already, confirming many Asians in their growing belief in an eventual Communist takeover of all Asia, shaking hitherto staunch anti-Communists in their resolve-and giving other nations nuclear ideas. Thanks mostly to technology supplied by the U.S., a dozen or more countriesamong them Egypt, Israel, India, Japan, West Germany and Mexico—possess reactors capable of producing uranium or plutonium. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission estimates that nowadays, for an investment of \$50 million, a country can establish enough plutonium production to manufacture one crude weapon a year. Communist China's example, as President Johnson puts it, tempts other states to equal folly.

The Alternatives. Except on Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa, there is remarkably little talk of curbing Peking's folly by hitting the Chinese before they are really strong enough to hit back. In Washington, a U.S. Congressman asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk why the U.S. had not "detonated that bomb for them"—in other words, blown up Peking's embryo nuclear establishment. Rusk replied: "We considered this but decided against it." In effect, such a decision, in all probability, would not be merely to take out a bomb or a plant, but to go to war with China—and per-

haps ultimately with Russia.

On the other hand, there is growing talk that China must somehow be softened up and brought to some form of responsibility. Some feel this can be done through trade, which might turn the Chinese into "fat Communists," presumably less aggressive than lean ones. The British Labor government announced last week that a trade mission will visit Peking next month to open an industrial exhibition (the exhibit was prepared under the Tory government, for in Britain desire for trade with China is bipartisan). And for all its avowed concern about the Chinese fallout, Japan last week gave no indication of halting its burgeoning trade with Peking-worth \$200 million this year. All of this is bound to be helpful to the Chinese nuclear program, whether or not the trade items are technically nonstrategic.

Then there is the U.N. argument. Weathervane Cambodia hurried to introduce a resolution to seat Peking in the United Nations, proposing the question for the docket of the forthcoming



PEKING CHILDREN READING ALL ABOUT IT A bigger, neighborly bomb by 1970.





TECHNOLOGY'S COUSINS




LABOR'S GUNTER





TRADE'S JAY





OVERSEAS' CASTLE

General Assembly session. The proposal drew support from former Republican Presidential Candidate Alf Landon, and Paris' Gaullist newspaper La Nation called Peking's entry inevitable—all on the argument that membership in the community of nations might change Peking's belligerent policies. No one was predicting whether Mao Tse-tung would get in during 1965, but he had almost certainly narrowed his 41-to-57 margin of last year.

Said a high State Department official last week: "If the U.S. had made an atomic test in the air, there would have been cries to expel us from the U.N. The Chinese explode one and people want to bring them in. These are the dividends of being a bastard."

GREAT BRITAIN

Looking Left

Never in Britain's history—not even under German guns in 1940—had a new government moved so quickly and decisively to reshape the molds of power as Labor did last week. Prime Minister Harold Wilson machine-gunned appointments out of No. 10 Downing Street, by week's end had named 101 ministers, the highest total since the early 1700s. Whitehall was a shambles of furniture movers and displaced teamakers as Wilson shifted departments and created four new ministries: Economic Affairs, Technology, Overseas Development, and Land and Natural Resources.

Though Wilson had been expected to scatter his appointments across the party's political spectrum and had a certain number of personal debts to repay, he went out of his way to give Labor's troublesome, hard-core left-wingers seats in the new government—including six in the Cabinet itself.

Archers at Agincourt. Wilson may intend to isolate and contain them by bringing them into the government, but with Labor's narrow majority, some of Wilson's own advisers were clearly trou-

Wearing special Russian academic garb.

bled by his look to the left. Among the leftists named:

The biggest crush in Whitehall since 1700.

Frank Cousins, 60, Minister of Technology. A hulking six-footer who began working the coal pits at 14, Cousins by 1938 was a full-time labor organizer. As boss of the 1,300,000-man Transport Union, Cousins clashed with Labor's late solidly NATO-minded Hugh Gaitskell and stubbornly called for Britain's unilateral disarmament. Cousins argued that Britain had defended itself in World War II without A-bombs. Gaitskell's withering reply: "And the British archers won at Agincourt without machine guns." Among Cousins' new responsibilities: overseeing Britain's atomic-energy establishment.

▶ Barbara Castle, 53, Minister of Overseas Development. A pert redhead with a flair for fashion, she came from a Yorkshire Laborite family, was an ardent member of the old, deep-pink Popular Front Socialist League. Her idea of a Sunday in the park is addressing a crowd from a Trafalgar Square plinth. She has made all the Aldermaston ban-the-bomb marches, has long had a passion for emergent Africa, the purview of her new job.

▶ Richard Crossman, 56, Minister of Housing. Probably the most prolific pamphleteer alive in Britain today, Crossman, a former Oxford don, has long been the brilliant, erratic idea man of the Labor Party, was a member of the Keep Left group of party rebels that sniped at the last Labor government while it was in power. His main task: to carry through the state takeover of urban land, which Labor hopes will solve Britain's soaring land inflation.

The Cabinet also leans left with Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood, 53, an elegant charm boy and professional rebel who quit Gaitskell's "Shadow Cabinet" in 1960 to signal his support of unilateral disarmament. Outside Cabinet rank, Wilson has given ministerial posts to another 25 hard-core leftists. The majority of Wilson's Cabinet remains right of center. In addition to early rightist appointments (George

Brown, James Callaghan, Patrick Gordon Walker), he has named others, notably Labor Minister Raymond Gunter, 55, a tough, adroit trade unionist with strong views about how to reform unions. Right as well, and roaming the corridors of power as Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Technology, will be, fittingly enough, Scientist-Author C. P. Snow, 59, who has exhaustively and vicariously explored Whitehall in a clutch of bestselling novels.

Up to Five. In the best British tradition, Loyal Opposition Leader Sir Alec Douglas-Home promised that the Tories would hold their fire for the first few months to give the new government a chance, even increased Wilson's majority by agreeing to keep a Tory M.P. in the speakership of the House of Commons. Since the speaker cannot vote, Wilson's effective majority thus went up from four to five. The Tories also agreed to pair off ministers in parliamentary votes, thereby enabling Laborites to leave the country on official business without endangering the government's margin.

And travel they intend to do. Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker, who lost his constituency in the elections and thus for the moment has no Commons seat, is due in Washington this week. President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay will soon be off to Peking to open a British industrial exhibit. Commonwealth Relations Minister Arthur Bottomley barely had time to find his office before flying off to Zambia's independence celebrations, may have to go on to deal with obstreperous Southern Rhodesia.

Faced with an impending balance of payments crisis and plenty of other troubles, the Prime Minister himself was not going anywhere for a while. But as he prepared the Queen's Speech to Parliament, outlining the legislative ambitions of his new government, Wilson was clearly out to make the most of the first weeks of grace any new government enjoys. He may never have it so good again.